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AbStrACt
After the reunification of Germany, the Bundeswehr had to take over the former 
East-German army (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA). The reduction in the numbers 
of military staff throughout Eastern Europe after the Cold War also made the 
task more difficult. 
Researchers from the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences interviewed 
East-German soldiers immediately after reunification. They found that most of 
them were obedient followers whose professional skills were good, but who had 
no initiative. The strong influence of dogmatic communist ideology was also a 
problem. Many former East-German officers thought that West Germany also 
had one book of truth that taught them the new, correct understanding of his-
tory, politics and society. The East-German army was not popular among the 
population. The status of an officer in society was privileged and there were many 
of them – similar to the Soviet army, junior officers in the East-German army 
served in positions that in western armies are covered by non-commissioned 
officers. Conscripts were almost fully at the mercy of the officers.
There were ca 42,000 officers in the NVA at the end of 1989. More than 99% 
of East-German officers were members of the Socialist Union Party of Germany. 
Approximately 10,000 political officers served in the NVA. Approximately 50,000 
active servicemen, incl. 23,000 officers, were to be transferred according to the 
takeover plan. These servicemen were put on probation for two years, and once it 
was completed the 28-member Independent Committee selected those who were 
to be offered the opportunity to join the Bundeswehr career system.
All political officers were the first to be let go, but generals, colonels (with a 
couple of exceptions) and all officers over 55 years ago were also released from 
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duty. As for the remaining officers, everyone who was known to have cooperated 
with the secret services of East Germany was immediately fired. 30,000 of the 
50,000 officers and non-commissioned officers transferred by the Bundeswehr 
soon resigned.
Introduction
From 1990–1993 the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, faced the 
daunting task of absorbing the old East German armed forces (NVA – 
National People’s Army) and retraining and re-educating thousands of 
officers and NCOs who had served the East German regime and bringing 
them into the Bundeswehr as career soldiers. This study1 will focus on 
a recent example of how the officer and NCO corps of a corrupt, brutal 
1 Origin of the Study. This paper is a period piece. It was written as an academic research 
study in early 2003 with the intent of helping the US forces then engaged in toppling the regime 
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq by providing a model of how to deal with the Iraqi armed forces after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein. This research was supported by the US Army War College and at 
the time was intended to support the efforts of the US Army War College Iraq planning group 
that had in late 2002 and early 2003 published an outline plan for the occupation of Iraq (see: 
Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill eds., Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions 
for Military forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Carlisle PA: US Army War College, Feb. 2003). 
The outline plan for the occupation of Iraq strongly recommended that the US military NOT 
disband the Iraqi army after the defeat of Saddam Hussein, but rather take over the force and 
remould it over time. Needless to say, as this paper was completed in the spring of 2003 the US 
leadership, acting against the advice of the pre-war Army planners, decided to disband the Iraqi 
Armed Forces that had during the war largely demobilised themselves and gone home to await 
events. The disbanding of the Iraqi Armed Forces was the key event that triggered the start of 
the insurgency in Iraq and led to eight years of American and Coalition counterinsurgency 
operations in that country (see: James Corum, Fighting the War on Terror (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 
2007). In light of that strategically disastrous decision by the Bush administration, this paper 
shows that there were other alternatives to disbanding the Iraqi Armed Forces and that the 
following bloody internal conflict in Iraq might have been mitigated or largely avoided if other 
paths had been taken. The following text is from the study this author wrote for the US Army 
in 2003 and argues that the Iraqi Armed Forces might have been successfully remodelled and 
reformed if the Bundeswehr’s model for absorbing the East German Armed Forces had been 
followed. (Author’s note.)
Parts about and comparison with Iraq have been omitted for this version of the study, newly 
edited for publication in the Estonian Yearbook of Military History. (Editor’s note.)
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and totalitarian state was vetted, retrained and re-educated to serve as the 
officers of a democracy. The paper explores the first steps of building a 
new army, that is the process of selecting the officers and NCOs from the 
old regime who were capable of meeting basic standards of professional 
competence (after additional training) for Bundeswehr service and who 
had the willingness to be re-educated and to serve in the armed forces of 
a democratic state – with all the cultural changes that such a step entailed.
Understanding the problem: getting a comprehensive 
picture of the former East German soldiers
In absorbing officers and NCOs of the old East German armed forces, 
one of the first things the Bundeswehr did was to build a picture of the 
mentality of the East German soldiers, their culture, their political and 
social understanding and their current beliefs about their future in a 
democratic state. The Bundeswehr possesses a first-rate institute for 
military sociology, the Socialwissenschaftliche Institut der Bundeswehr, 
and employs a group of highly qualified civilian academic experts who 
regularly produce studies on the demographics and social attitudes of the 
Bundeswehr. In late 1990, as the NVA was taken over by the Bundeswehr, 
the Bundeswehr’s top sociologists went to work administering a wide 
variety of opinion polls and interviews (responder’s identity was anon-
ymous) to build up some accurate data about the background, educa-
tion, worldview, etc., of the NVA officer and NCO corps. With the data 
provided by the Bundeswehr sociologists, the Bundeswehr command-
ers, Defence Ministry and Military Personnel Office had a good basis to 
develop personnel policies appropriate for the selection of East German 
officers and NCOs.
The process is described in detail in Frithjof Knabe, Unter der 
Flagge des Gegners (Under the Flag of the Enemy).2 Knabe describes the 
2 Frithjof Knabe, Unter der Flagge des Gegners (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994). Due 
to the nature of the paper being originally a report, there are only a few footnotes, but the list 
of the most important literature is given in the endnotes. (Editor’s note.)
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 methodology, the questions and the results of extensive surveys of the 
East Germans. As well as information describing the education and social 
background of the East German soldiers, the West German sociologists 
developed a series of questions to explore such issues as: the strength of 
commitment to the communist ideology, the view East Germans had of 
West Germans, the expectations for a reunited Germany, and the moti-
vation for former East German officers to apply to join the Bundeswehr 
(devotion to the military profession, fear of unemployment, hope for a 
better future, etc.). Another series of questions developed the theme of 
how much trust the East Germans had in the German government and 
what their political views were. The questions were analysed in terms of 
rank and age as well as their education level.
To make a long story shorter, much of the data that the Bundeswehr’s 
sociology experts developed came as a big surprise to the West German 
professional officers. In a generation and a half of totalitarian rule, the 
East Germans had become a notably different kind of German – cultur-
ally and socially very different from their West German counterparts. For 
most of the officers under the rank of lieutenant colonel, the East German 
government had long lost its credibility. However, the NVA officers also 
tended to have relatively low expectations from the West German gov-
ernment or gave it little credibility. Most of the officers had received an 
education that was so military in nature that they had no civilian diploma 
or qualifications to fall back on. Many, if not most, had applied to the 
Bundeswehr more out of a feeling of desperation and a desire for per-
sonal and family security than for love of the military profession. The 
older officers, as might be expected, had been part of the power structure 
and ideology of communism for so long and saw the West so strongly as 
the enemy, it was clear that they would not wish to have any part of the 
Bundeswehr. Having been raised in a communist dictatorship, there was 
a relatively immature understanding of democracy and politics among 
the officers. When asked which political party they preferred, the largest 
number, 11.2%, preferred the left-oriented SPD. A surprising 9.9% pre-
ferred the free market FDP. 7.4% preferred the neo-communist PDS and 
6.7% populist groups (often extreme). Only 6.3% preferred the conserva-
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tive CDU and almost as many, 5.4%, would vote for the rightist–radical 
Republikaner Partei. 26.9% had not yet decided upon any political orien-
tation and 17.5 % said that they had no interest in voting.3 In short, the 
East German soldiers were all over the map politically and demonstrated 
little understanding of how democratic societies function.
The senior German officers who ran the process of absorbing the 
East German armed forces all remarked on just how sovietised the East 
German armed forces had become in their mentality. One might have 
expected that some remnant of the traditional German military virtues 
3 Knabe, Unter der Flagge, 165.
Soldiers of two units of the National People’s Army on demonstration at the 
Albert Zimmermann Barracks in Cottbus demanding an immediate military 
reform with a reduction of military service to 12 months (12 January 1990). 
Rainer Weisflog/Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst – Zentralbild /
German Federal Archives
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such as decisiveness, initiative and willingness to take authority might 
have survived in the East German military culture. Yet this was not so. 
While the East Germans were well educated and had a solid grounding in 
their military specialties, they were used to obeying orders to the letter, 
doing only what they were told and no more. It was a highly regulated 
and risk adverse army where authority was never questioned, where the 
party line was strictly adhered to and where officers could advance best if 
they showed no initiative or non-conformity at any time. Indeed, many 
West German military professionals remarked that one could spot former 
East German officers by these traits for years after they were absorbed 
into the Bundeswehr. For example, in courses taught by the Bundeswehr 
immediately after German reunification the East Germans out of habit 
would seek out the one “correct” book on a political or historical theme. 
They would generally try to ascertain what the “correct” party line was on 
any political or social issue. While their technical skills were often good, 
few were able of expressing any kind of critical thought – whether it was 
about tactics, politics, defence policy and so on.4
Indeed, the Bundeswehr quickly discovered that it faced a far larger 
cultural divide than it had anticipated. Re-education of officers and NCOs 
in the basics of democracy, German history, constitutional law and so on 
would be required for all the former East German officers and NCOs who 
applied for the Bundeswehr.
Noteworthy aspects of the East German  
armed forces
The East German armed forces were built upon the Soviet model and, 
as a result, had all the strengths and weaknesses of that model. The first 
issue was loyalty to the state – and this, in practice meant proven loyalty 
to the Communist Party (called the SED or Socialist Unity Party in East 
Germany). About 99.5% of the officer corps of the East German armed 
4 Interview with LTC Luftwaffe ret. Michael Burkhardt 11 May 2003. Burkhart ran courses in 
German history for former East German officers in the early 1990s. (Author’s note.)
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forces were party members. The only exceptions seem to have been some 
of the medical officers and staff doctors of the Army Medical Corps who 
were not pushed to join the SED if they were competent professionals. 
The officer aspirants, the officers and their families were carefully vetted 
to ensure that they or their immediate families were known to be solid 
supporters of the regime. Since many, if not most, families in East Ger-
many had relatives in West Germany one could have cousins in the West 
and still serve in the armed forces – just as long as the East German officer 
had no regular or close contacts with them.
As party members, the officer corps was completely indoctrinated in 
the communist worldview. Indeed, the party ideology and education was 
entrusted to a large corps of 10,000 political officers who were distrib-
uted throughout the armed forces at every level and who supervised the 
constant program of political education for all soldiers as well as acting 
as the eyes and ears of the Stasi (Ministry for State Security – i.e. Secret 
Police). The West German officers who ran education courses for the East 
German officers and NCOs in 1991–1993 noted that the East Germans 
understood history, politics, law, social concepts, etc., almost completely 
through the eyes of the properly educated communist. Indeed, the whole 
political/social vocabulary for those educated under a communist state is 
different.
The East German Air Force was even more oriented towards party 
loyalty than the Army. In contrast to the Western air forces where the 
physical and mental standards required for flying the airplane play the 
paramount role in selecting people for pilot training, the criteria in East 
Germany was: 1. Politics 2. Politics 3. Politics. The East Germans were 
apparently afraid that their jet pilots might defect to the West so they were 
thoroughly vetted for loyalty to the regime. If one even had a cousin living 
in West Germany, this ruled out being accepted for flight training. East 
German pilots always flew under rigid control from the ground and were 
granted no opportunities whatsoever for independent flight manoeuvring.
The East German Army was an officer-heavy army – just as one finds 
in the Soviet model. There was a corps of professional NCOs in the East 
German Army, but virtually all of these were technical specialists (signals, 
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supply, mechanics, administration, radar operators, etc.) NCOs were 
expected to carry out a specialised function – but had very little author-
ity to lead. Nor were NCOs expected to or trained to lead soldiers. This 
meant that in the East German officer corps junior officers performed 
tasks normally done by NCOs in the Western armies. In the East German 
army, promotion was accelerated much faster than in the Bundeswehr, 
but majors normally did the same jobs as captains and so on.
While there were a few officers in the East German Army who 
received a normal civilian education and then served as “time contract 
officers” (army service for 2–3 years and then to reserve status), the vast 
majority had gone to the officer academy and had received a purely mili-
tary education and expected to serve the whole term of a 30-year career 
as officer on active duty.
The officer corps of the East German state were something of pam-
pered darlings of the state. They got good housing – at least good by East 
German standards. They had access to special Communist Party stores 
and could buy little delicacies, clothes, etc., that the average East German 
couldn’t buy. If an officer did not have a car, he and his family could at 
least be driven to social functions or shopping by a soldier in a military 
vehicle. In short, as loyal Party members they had many special privileges.
Many aspects of the East German military culture followed the totali-
tarian Soviet model and made for poor troop morale and further alien-
ated the officer class from civil society. The East German Army was kept at 
an 85% readiness level around the clock. This meant that enlisted soldiers 
were not granted much leave and were confined to the military instal-
lations most of the time. Discipline was very strict on the Soviet model 
and the one place for initiative that the officers had was in punishing the 
soldiers. Enlisted soldiers had no real rights and officers were fairly free to 
tyrannise the troops. Enlisted men could be fined and confined to jail for 
a week simply on the say of the company commander. Relations between 
enlisted soldiers and officers were strictly regulated and anything but 
absolute obedience was punished.
While the special privileges and good pay for officers made the East 
German army a fairly attractive career, it also put the officers apart from 
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the average East German. The general population generally viewed the 
professional officers as something very separate from civilian society – as a 
group that belonged more to the Communist Party than the general popu-
lation. In short, only a small percentage of East Germans found a military 
career attractive. Most of the army conscripts were called up, served their 
time at low pay and in barracks and facilities that would be unacceptable 
to any Western recruits, and left the army at the end of their service with 
the hope of having nothing more to do with the military for the rest of 
their lives. The military had a type of prestige, but in the eyes of the aver-
age person, it was not an institution that was popular or something they 
would recommend to their children. One might note that a large part of 
the West German population is either anti-military or ambivalent about 
service in the armed forces. This tendency was even more notable in East 
Germany. The army wasn’t hated, but it was not liked very much.
A special command set up to absorb  
the East German army
After the East German dictatorship under Erich Honecker dramatically 
collapsed in November 1989, the East German Defence Ministry quickly 
reduced its forces and planned for the unification of the two Germanys. 
In the early stages, it was unclear as to how the East and West German 
armies would be merged. The date for merging the two Germanys was set 
for 3rd of October 1990. The West German Defence Ministry determined 
that the Bundeswehr would simply take over command of the East Ger-
man army and work out a process of allowing thousands of the career 
officers and NCOs the chance to retrain and formally become regular 
Bundeswehr officers and NCOs. It would be a difficult process as the 
Bundeswehr planned to reduce the total force to 370,000 men by 1994 
(from about 470,000) as part of the post Cold War force reductions.
The Bundeswehr quickly came up with a plan. On 3rd of October it 
would take over the 90,000 solders of the NVA (Nationale Volksarmee – 
National People’s Army), which would include 23,000 officers, 27,000 
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NCOs and 40,000 draftee enlisted men.5 The NVA had already drastically 
reduced its force in early 1990. At the time of the Berlin Wall falling, the 
NVA had approximately 42,000 officers. During early 1990, the approxi-
mately 10,000 political officers of the NVA were released from service as 
the Bundeswehr had made clear that there was no place for the politi-
cal officers of the East German regime in the Bundeswehr. Indeed, the 
large number of political officers indicates just how much the NVA was 
an instrument of the Communist Party. All officers over the age of 55 
were retired and very few officers over the age of 50 were kept on. The 
Bundeswehr staff had made it clear from the start that it felt that officers 
who had served the Communist regime for decades would be unlikely to 
adapt to a democratic army. Indeed, thousands of East German officers 
asked to be released from service as they still adhered to the Communist 
worldview and could not bring themselves to serve in democratic armed 
forces. Thousands more NVA officers also resigned from the military in 
the hope that they could make it in the capitalist world as managers, tech-
nicians and businessmen. There was considerable hope that a reunited 
and capitalist Germany would provide great opportunities to bright and 
ambitious men and some today say that it was the best educated and 
brightest younger officers who got out and moved into the civilian sector 
and it was the less educated officers with few marketable civilian skills and 
with less ambition who remained and applied to serve in the Bundeswehr. 
There are no studies of what happened to the old NVA officer corps avail-
able but many Bundeswehr officers suspect that there’s some truth to the 
idea that the best men did not join the Bundeswehr. There are many suc-
cessful individual examples of former NVA officers that did make it in the 
business world. One group of NVA doctors left the service together and 
opened up a private medical practice in the Eastern suburbs of Berlin. 
They’re quite rich now.
On the day of unification the Bundeswehr established a special joint 
command, Territorial Command East. It was headed by two highly expe-
5 The following information comes from the Draft Plan of Territorial Command East in 
the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg im Breisgau, January–March 1991. The information 
throughout the article comes from that document.
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rienced senior officers, commanded by General Joerg Schoenbohm with 
Lt. General Werner von Scheven as chief of staff. The Territorial Com-
mand East was a new kind of command for the Bundeswehr.6 It included 
approximately 90,000 officers, NCOs and soldiers of the East German 
army who would remain as part of this special command for two years as 
the Bundeswehr sorted them all out. All of the senior command positions 
were taken over by officers from the West, mostly men carefully chosen 
for success in command and staff positions. 821 officers and NCOs were 
brought in from the West to fill major command and staff positions. On 
the day the East German Army was dissolved, 100 Bundeswehr officers 
6 All the following material on Territorial Command East comes from an interview by the 
author with Lt. Gen. Werner von Scheven, ret., April 2003.
National People’s Army 
soldiers in Bad Salzungen 
(in former East German 
motorised infantry 
barracks) receive new 
uniforms “Made by 
Bundeswehr”, but they 
are allowed to start 
wearing them only from 
October 3rd onwards  
(20th of September 1990). 
Ralph Hirschberger/
Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Nachrichten dienst – 
Zentralbild/German 
Federal Archives
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and NCOs organised into training teams arrived in the East to supervise 
the training of junior military leaders (company officers, platoon lead-
ers and squad leaders) in the Bundeswehr system. Of the 51,000 civilian 
employees of the East German Defence Ministry, 48,300 were taken on 
under short-term contracts mostly to provide basic services and to serve 
in the dismantling of most of East Germany’s formidable military infra-
structure. It was helpful to have some experienced civilian administrators 
but several hundred West German defense civilians were brought in to 
serve in leadership roles.7
The Territorial Command East had the unusual job of carrying on 
standard military duties and training to include accepting and train-
ing draftees from East Germany in the training centres and conducting 
normal military training and exercises. The job also included closing 
down much of the East German military infrastructure, securing thou-
sands of Soviet-type tanks, guns, APCs, etc., that were superfluous to the 
Bundeswehr’s needs. An additional task was retraining all 90,000 of the 
East German soldiers in the culture and laws of a democratic system. At 
the same time, the Bundeswehr had to carefully examine the officers and 
NCOs who wished to remain as career solders in the Bundeswehr and 
select those best suited for retention.
The Bundeswehr decided to put all the former East German career 
officers and NCOs into a special conscription category. Those who 
wished could sign a two-year contract to serve in the Bundeswehr and 
at the end of that period the Bundeswehr would determine who would 
be offered permanent career status. Essentially, the whole officer and 
NCO corps of the NVA were placed on probationary status. Immediately 
after the Bundeswehr took over, the former NVA officers and NCOs who 
had remained had a three-month period to apply for the two-year con-
tract. If they did not apply, they would be released from service – albeit 
with unemployment benefits, a job training program and so on. Several 
7 An excellent overview of the handling of personnel issues in absorbing the East German 
armed forces is found in Edgar Trost, “Probleme der Personalauswahl,” – Ein Staat – Eine 
Armee: von der NVA zu Bundeswehr, Hrsg. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 
1992), 170–205.
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thousand more officers and NCOs decided not to go through with the 
application process – especially as it became known that long service 
as an informer for the Stasi (Ministry for State Security) would ensure 
the applicant’s rejection. In any case, the Bundeswehr decided on a firm 
two-year transition period. At the end of 1992 the former NVA personnel 
would be fully absorbed into the Bundeswehr or become civilians and the 
Territorial Command East would be abolished.
When Territorial Command East was set up, the Bundeswehr decided 
that it would not consider keeping any former East German generals on 
active duty. Despite lobbying pressure by the East German politicians, no 
colonels were to be kept on duty or considered for transition to career sta-
tus in the Bundeswehr. The only exception to the rule was military doc-
tors of the NVA. However, 5–6 generals of the old regime were hired on 
short-term contracts as civilians to serve as advisors to the new command 
as well as some former colonels who worked as civilian specialists for a 
short period to assist with tasks such as cataloguing the munitions and 
material of the NVA that were now Bundeswehr property. In the same 
manner many staff officers of the NVA served in staff functions for Ter-
ritorial Command East. The Bundeswehr was adamant on the point that 
the older officers were so deeply indoctrinated in the communist system 
and were probably so morally compromised by their long service in the 
East German dictatorship, that they would not be acceptable members 
of a democratic army. The Bundeswehr decided that the younger offi-
cers and NCOs offered the best hope to be retrained and re-educated to 
serve in a democratic armed forces. Many officers and NCOs with rela-
tively high rank and who wished to continue in the Bundeswehr were 
demoted one or two ranks. Promotion had been accelerated in the NVA 
and this would bring the officers and senior NCOs more into line with the 
Bundeswehr rank, responsibility and promotions system.
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Selecting an officer and NCO corps –  
the application process
The application process started with the normal Bundeswehr application 
questionnaire that reads much like an application for US Army enlist-
ment. It includes personal data, medical data, educational data, and a 
preference list for the branch of the military and occupational specialty 
desired and so on. Like the US enlistment applications, there are also 
questions about any arrest and conviction records as well as membership 
in subversive organisations.
All former East German soldiers also had to fill out a special appen-
dix questionnaire detailing their record of Communist Party member-
ship and activity in Party-linked or controlled organisations. They also 
had to account for contacts and membership in communist organisations 
for members of their household and family. Most importantly, they had 
to describe in detail their contacts and relationship with the Secret Police 
(Stasi) and whether they had agreed verbally or in writing to become 
a regular informer for the Secret Police. This was especially important 
because the East German Secret Police kept 100,000 East Germans from 
all walks of life (teachers, government officials, soldiers, tradesmen, etc.) 
on a secret payroll to regularly and secretly inform on their neighbours, 
bosses and subordinates. Indeed, this was part of the pervasive repres-
sion of East German communism. When taking the figure of 100,000 
secret informers spread through a population of about 18 million, one 
can understand the totalitarian nature of the state.
Virtually all East Germans, especially those in the armed forces, had 
to play along with the communist regime. Party membership and activ-
ity was unavoidable. However, service as a Stasi informer or too close 
links to the internal and external intelligence services of East Germany 
disqualified applicants from enlisting in the Bundeswehr. All of the 
former East Germans who applied to join the Bundeswehr had their 
detailed and signed questionnaires carefully checked against the records 
of the Stasi and of the Communist Party and its organisations by the 
Bundeswehr Personnel office and the Bundeswehr Counterintelligence 
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Corps. If the applicant clearly lied about his relationship with the Com-
munist Party and its security organs, his application was immediately 
rejected.
Even if the application was accepted and the former East German 
soldier entered service on a short-term contract his application and back-
ground information was constantly reviewed and checked against the 
vast database of Communist Party and Stasi documents. If, at a later time, 
the former East German soldier was found to have lied in his applica-
tion, he was immediately removed from the military for cause, usually 
within three days. In any case, several hundred of the more than 11,000 
officers who signed short service contracts and joined the Bundeswehr 
were summarily removed when information later surfaced concerning 
their relationship to the Communist party and State Security. There were 
also many cases where the Bundeswehr Counterintelligence Corps could 
not prove that the applicant had lied, but still recommended removal 
from the service on the judgment of the Counterintelligence officials 
that a soldier was still committed to the Communist worldview and had 
been more involved with the Communist Party than his special applica-
tion questionnaire had indicated. There were several dozen cases of this 
nature, perhaps over 100. I know of no cases in which the Independent 
Committee or the Bundeswehr Personnel Office overrode the judgment 
of the Counterintelligence Corps and tried to retain an officer or NCO 
after a negative judgment. The rule was apparently that if the officer or 
NCO’s commitment to democracy was doubtful or that his involvement 
in the old Communist regime had been too extensive or enthusiastic, he 
would be removed from the service. Period. The Bundeswehr was more 
than ready to remove qualified and technically competent officers and 
NCOs simply on the belief that these men could not fit into armed forces 
with Western ethics and a democratic ethos.
Part of the application process consisted of a long interview with 
Bundeswehr officers and officials, often lasting 1–1.5 hours. The appli-
cant’s background and motivations and views were examined in detail. 
These interviews were usually taped and transcripts made for the use of 
the Personnel Office of Territorial Command East and of the Indepen-
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dent Committee that had the final say on accepting officers into the regu-
lar career track of the Bundeswehr.
The application process, beyond the special background checks, also 
included examinations, checking educational background, a medical 
exam and so on. Many who applied for the two-year contract were not 
approved due to a weak education, poor exam scores or medical prob-
lems. A few thousand of those who applied were quickly weeded out and 
released from military service.
Of the 50,000 officers and NCOs taken into the Bundeswehr in Octo-
ber 1990, 30,000 were soon released per their own wish. Of the 23,000 
officers, 11,700 opted to sign the two-year contract with the Bundeswehr 
in early 1991. 12,300 of the 27,000 East German NCOs signed contracts 
and only 1,000 of the 40,000 lower enlisted men opted for the two-year 
contract. Of the applicants, 6,000 officers were approved for the two-year 
contract, 11,200 NCOs were approved and 800 lower enlisted.8
A timeline was set up for absorbing, reorganising and dissolving the old 
NVA forces and the integration of selected personnel into the Bundeswehr. 
In 1991, former NVA soldiers of all ranks were allowed a three-month 
window (1st of October to the 31st of December) to move beyond their 
two-year contracts and apply for career status in the Bundeswehr or to 
serve another period of contract service. The Bundeswehr personnel 
office promised that a clear decision would be made on each application 
by the 31st of August 1992. Between November 1992 and June 1993 the 
officers who had signed two-year contracts with the Bundeswehr would 
be released and those accepted brought into full career status. In 1993 Ter-
ritorial Command East would complete its mission and shut down. The 
timeline plan allowed for a systematic reorganisation of the Bundeswehr 
and enough time to properly assess all of the personnel applications and 
proved to be quite successful.
8 For statistical details of the NVA see: Das Ende der NVA und die deutsche Einheit. Zeitzeu-
genberichte und Dokumente. 2. Aufl., Hrsg. Hans Ehlert (Hamburg: Christopher Links Verlag, 
2002).
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Re-educating an army
One of the first steps of the Bundeswehr in taking over the former East 
German soldiers was to send 2,000 officers and NCOs to special eight 
week courses in West Germany where they were taught German history, 
political science from a democratic perspective, the German constitution, 
military law and tradition, and a large dose of the Innere Fuehrung (Inner 
Leadership) curriculum that has been part of the Bundeswehr training 
and tradition since the Bundeswehr was established in 1955. The concept 
of Inner Leadership is essentially a Western-style political education pro-
gram for the military that emphasises the place of the military in serv-
ing a democratic state, the rights that all soldiers have in a democracy, 
the role of an officer and NCO in a democratic and civilian-run armed 
forces, the proper values that an officer and NCO and common soldier 
need to personalise in their daily lives as soldiers and servants of the state. 
Through the whole two-year absorption process, former East German 
soldiers were sent to special courses set up in West Germany.
The urgent requirement of the Bundeswehr was not simply to educate 
the former East German soldiers in the laws, regulations and mores or 
the Bundeswehr but also to begin to change their entire mind-set and 
to positively accept democracy and democratic values. The Bundeswehr 
ensured that experienced, well-qualified and well-educated officers and 
NCOs ran the courses. Usually the officers who taught the East Germans 
had completed the General Staff course and had a civilian liberal arts edu-
cation as well as experience in teaching. Officers who were active in the 
special courses for the East Germans in 1991–93 remarked that it was 
very difficult at first for the thoroughly indoctrinated East Germans to 
grasp the concept of openly discussing issues or critically reading texts 
or even asking a superior questions or disagreeing with the teacher on 
any point. Typically, the sharpest of the East German officers would ask 
the course teachers for the one “proper” book on a subject – one that 
explained the party line and which the officer could be expected to mem-
orise and regurgitate to pass the course or win approval. This was the 
pervasive mentality in East Germany; one found the correct party line as 
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quickly as possible and followed it. It has been quite a chore to re-educate 
East Germans to think critically or question their superiors in the last 
decade. One German military historian commented that the East Ger-
man military historians now working with the Bundeswehr were highly 
educated under the old regime and had a mastery of the basics of the 
historian’s craft. However, the East Germans still are notably lacking in 
critical skills such as the ability to criticise historical works or to compare 
several books against each other.
On the purely military side, the job of training soldiers in military 
skills appears not to have been difficult. The East German officers and 
NCOs were well educated and trained in the technical skills of soldier-
ing. What the former East German officers and NCOs lacked was initia-
tive. They were used to a strict system and following orders to the letter. 
Mission-type orders common to Western armies (“Complete such and 
such task with available resources by such and such time”) which leave 
the planning and execution of the order in the hands of the commander 
or even senior NCO were not part of the professional mind-set of the East 
German officers and NCOs. They were used to being told not just what to 
do but exactly how to do it. Again, the West German training teams and 
unit commanders assigned to Territorial Command East had to work hard 
to instil a completely different ethos into the former East German soldiers.
Evaluating the East Germans
Highly experienced Bundeswehr officers and NCOs were assigned to 
almost all of the senior leadership positions in Territorial Command East. 
Division, Brigade and battalion commander positions and command of 
other large units of the existing East German Army force were taken over 
by Bundeswehr officers. Many of the critical staff positions down to bat-
talion level were filled by West Germans and some officers and NCOs 
even assigned down to the company level although the usual apportion-
ment was for a few career Bundeswehr officers and NCOs to be found 
at the battalion level. The Troop Command East was largely staffed with 
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career Bundeswehr officers and NCOs but many staff officers of the NVA 
remained. In addition, thousands of civilian employees of the old East 
German Defence Ministry remained to staff and support Bundeswehr 
operations in the East. Civilian employees of the Bundeswehr were also 
employed, like the officers and NCOs of the East German regime, were 
also employed on short-term contracts.
It was made clear from the start that all the East German officers and 
NCOs who had applied for career soldier status in the Bundeswehr were 
on a probationary status for two years. Territorial Command East was 
not interested in performance reports, decorations, etc., from the NVA. 
Over the next two years, what would matter was performance in the 
courses and exams administered by the Bundeswehr and the officer and 
NCO efficiency reports written by the career Bundeswehr officers who 
had been placed in all the primary command and staff positions in the 
East. While former East German officers remained in command at the 
platoon and company level, their competence and performance would 
be critically judged by the career Bundeswehr soldiers. In addition, their 
attitude towards the democratic ethos of the Bundeswehr and their ability 
to adapt to the new system was carefully observed. At the final stage of 
the process of absorbing the old East German Army, the officer and NCO 
evaluation reports played a central role in the final selection process of 
the Independent Committee.
As the Bundeswehr planned a considerable downsizing, thousands 
of civilian employees of the NVA would have to be cut. There was a simi-
lar evaluation process for the civilian employees as for the East German 
officers and NCOs. Those who had worked with the Stasi or had been 
too closely associated with the Communist Party organisations and ethos 
were removed quickly. Those who wished to stay and become permanent 
civilian employees of the Bundeswehr also had to undergo a thorough 
weeding out process.
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Lessons in leadership – building trust
Many of the East German soldiers feared that the Bundeswehr would 
come in and act as an “occupation army” in their treatment of those 
who wished to continue a military career. One of the primary tasks of 
General Schoenboehm and General von Scheven was to allay such fears 
and to build a relationship of trust with the East German soldiers. In the 
treatment of soldiers under two-year contracts who were applying for 
Bundeswehr career status the slogan was “Everyone receives a fair chance”. 
This meant that each application would be treated fairly, that each appli-
cant would receive careful consideration in regards to his previous career 
and educational attainments, that selection in the Bundeswehr would be 
based solely upon merit and performance and that each applicant would 
be given the chance to show that he could make the grade as well as any 
other Bundeswehr officer.
For the officers and NCOs of the old East German armed forces who 
asked to be released from service, their was a program of unemployment 
stipends and paid tuition to a variety of job courses to allow those officers 
a good chance to make their way in civilian life. For the officers and NCOs 
who applied and who were not taken into the Bundeswehr, these pro-
grams were also available. The German government made sure that there 
was not a class of embittered and unemployed former East German sol-
diers who had been simply thrown out on the street. Such a thing would 
have been bad politics and bad for the reputation of the Bundeswehr. 
General Schoenboehm spent much of his time speaking to East and West 
German businessmen setting up shop in the former East Germany and 
encouraging them to hire former NVA officers and NCOs.
General Schoenboehm wrote an excellent account of his duty as com-
mander of Troop Command East that could serve as a useful guide to any 
officer who would have to deal with dissolving the army of a dictatorship 
and building a new democratic army in its place.9 General Schoenboehm 
and General von Scheven were constantly on the road to visit the East 
9 See: Joerg Schoenboehm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volks-
armee (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1992).
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German units, talk to the soldiers and to win their confidence. A large 
part of their job was to teach the East German officers and NCOs how to 
treat soldiers with fairness and dignity. The idea of a General visiting a 
unit informally and sitting and talking to troops and taking questions and 
answering questions was completely new to the East German military cul-
ture. Under the old regime, there was no informal contact. No one asked 
general questions or made any criticism or allowed anything beyond the 
view that everything was completely in order. The Bundeswehr officers 
and NCOs who came to staff Troop Command East were to set an exam-
ple of scrupulous fairness and honesty in their treatment of their soldiers 
and worked to train the East German officers and NCOs to treat soldiers 
with the respect that is normal for Western armies.
Schoenboehm devotes a long chapter of his book describing his daily 
activities and impressions in detail. For example, the East German draft-
ees were often very badly trained in carrying out basic military duties. 
Military vehicles Volkswagen Type 183, commonly known as Iltis – a donation 
to the Estonian Defence Forces by the German Bundeswehr – have arrived in 
Muuga Harbour (1997). Boriss Mäemets/Estonian Defence Forces
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There were several instances of East German troops on guard duty who 
shot themselves or the comrades while apparently playing with their fire-
arms. Basic guard procedures and firearms safety training had not been 
part of the East German military culture. In another instance, East Ger-
man soldiers on guard duty were confronted with a loud protest demon-
stration outside a military installation. They had no idea how to handle 
the situation – the concept of a political protest was somewhat unthink-
able while East Germany was a “workers’ paradise”. The Western concept 
of handling situations firmly and with the minimum required force was 
also unknown to the East German culture. In areas such as these, the 
commander of Troop Command East had to order more training in the 
basics for the East German soldiers.
The Independent Committee –  
final personnel decisions
In early 1992, the German government set up a committee of 28 members 
to review the records of all the officers and NCOs who applied for career 
status in the Bundeswehr. The Independent Committee was headed by a 
chairman and two deputy chairmen. It contained 11 senior retired civil 
servants, 7 retired military officers and NCOs, 4 academics, 3 current 
members of the German legislature, 2 current senior civil servants and 
2 other civilian members. The committee had full access to all the docu-
ments and records of the former East German personnel to include the 
files from the Ministry for State Security, files of the Communist Party, 
recent efficiency reports, training reports, exam results, interview tran-
scripts, application forms and so on. They also could request the military 
Counterintelligence Branch to search out additional information and 
provide reports on applicants.
The Independent Committee was organised into subcommittees of 
five members. For an applicant to be accepted into the Bundeswehr on 
long-term or career status, the unanimous approval of all five sub-com-
mittee members was required. The Independent Committee began work 
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in March 1992 and completed its work of evaluating thousands of officer 
and NCO applicants by early 1993. The criteria the Independent Com-
mittee used for acceptance into Bundeswehr career status was: applicant 
credibility and trustworthiness, the ability of the applicant to adapt to a 
democratic armed force, proper NCO and officer competence, and the 
ability to understand the past and to overcome it.
Members of the Independent Committee were carefully chosen by 
the German Defence Minister and the Military Committee of the Ger-
man parliament. It was overwhelmingly composed of retired experts with 
knowledge of and credibility with the military. It was decided that the 
majority of the Independent Committee members would be outside the 
ranks of active politicians and those currently holding high positions in 
the government to ensure that the committee would be well-insulated from 
political party pressures and outside influences. Although there were some 
current politicians and senior civil servants on the committee, they were 
greatly outnumbered by the non-political members. The appointment of 
the committee was carefully made to ensure that each applicant for NCO 
and officer status would be considered fairly and objectively and would not 
enter the Bundeswehr on the basis of purely political considerations.
By all accounts, the Independent Committee was a great success in 
that it got the job done efficiently and gave each applicant the kind of fair 
and objective treatment that the armed forces of a democracy requires. 
The Independent Committee started and finished its work with a high 
level of credibility and met the Bundeswehr’s policy that “each applicant 
was to have a fair chance”.
Summary of the transformation  
of the East German forces into the Bundeswehr
The Bundeswehr in 1991–1993 provides a useful model for the armed 
forces of a democratic state to take over the armed forces of a totalitar-
ian dictatorship and retrain those personnel in the culture of democracy. 
It was an exceptionally tough task as the influence of a generation and a 
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half of Communist rule had deeply affected the culture and psyche of the 
East Germans, particularly the military personnel who had been servants 
of the state. The German model provides a useful example of vetting the 
military personnel of a dictatorship and selecting suitable NCOs and offi-
cers for continued service in the armed forces of a democratic nation.
The Bundeswehr program was largely successful by most accounts. 
In a little over two years the Bundeswehr carefully weeded out officer 
and NCO applicants who were too closely connected with the Commu-
nist Party and its ideology. The Bundeswehr also weeded out those who 
simply could not adapt to a democratic system or those who lacked the 
education and basic skills to become effective career officers and NCOs. 
Those remaining spent extensive time being retrained in the principles of 
civilian control, learning German history from a non-communist view-
point, learning how democracy and democratic constitutions work as 
well as learning the tactical and operational methods of the Bundeswehr. 
Most importantly, the officers and NCOs from the old East German 
regime learned how to properly serve as military leaders of a free and 
democratic state.
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